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Abstract 
This  paper  intends  to  investigate  the  relations  between  former  imperial  powers  and  new  sovereign  states 
succeeding an empire in the field of international security, particularly when involving the use of force.  
Despite their stated attachment to the normative principles of what we usually call “Westphalian order”, former 
imperial powers continue to interfere in the domestic affairs of these new states, especially those unable to 
exercise their sovereignty efficiently and legitimately. One could say that, by military interventions, these powers 
deny the sovereignty of weak states in the regions once under their control; but the preparation of these missions 
makes the actions not to be interpreted as expressions of an imperialist attitude.  
I consider there are two major ideal-types that could better explain such interventions. In a power-oriented post-
imperial order, the intervention of a former empire is the result of the projection of its national interests and 
identities. In a norm-oriented post-imperial order, the sense of moral responsibility of the former imperial power 
is  the  main  reason  for  its  interference.  The  intervention’s  legitimacy  and  suitability  require  domestic  and 
international support. 
This paper, grounded on a constructivist approach, intends to contribute to the understanding of international 
security issues in terms of a world shaped by actors’ interests and identities and the dynamics of their relations. 
The identified ideal-types of post-imperial orders consider both material and cultural factors. The analytical 
elements that may link extremely different situations are the socially variable interpretations of past and present. 
Keywords: empire; hegemony; intervention; power-oriented post-imperial order (POPIO); norm-oriented post-
imperial order (NOPIO). 
The term “empire” seems to have gained in recent IR literature an incredible spreading, its 
usage covering various interpretations of the contemporary social world, as for the expansion of the 
global capitalism, or the projection of American military and political power, or the leveling of 
political expectations worldwide, and so on. In spite of their different meanings, all the forms the 
term “empire” is used suggest the image of unity and of an (un)conscious march toward this unity, or 
the “imperialism”. In this paper I use the term “empire” in a more narrow (and old-fashioned) way, 
as a territorial political entity. 
Despite this precaution, to define an empire is not a simple task. In the last half of millennium, 
we have witnessed the progressive establishment of what it is generally called the “Westphalian” 
order, where the political space is divided into separate territorial sovereign states, interacting in an 
anarchical environment. At least since the end of the two World Wars, the dominant idea of the 
legitimate  organizing  principle  of  a  sovereign  state  is  the  expression  of  the  will  of  a  political 
community shaped into a nation defined by the “self-determination” principle. It is precisely the 
claim  of every nation to benefit from sovereignty that makes the  system  to be anarchic, in the 
absence of any authority capable to impose the order into the system, by power and legitimacy. 
This conception is somehow misleading, because it is obvious that this legalistic point of view 
does not have an authentic correspondent in the political reality, for the contact between the nation-
states. In fact, the supposed anarchy of the international realm should be considered in practice only 
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in part, the states observing several ways of dealing with the anarchy. Many factors, material and 
ideational as  well,  contribute to  the  formation  of a  much more complex international  realm,  in 
particular due to the way the political entities understand and exercise the sovereignty, inside the 
borders and during their interactions with others. In a famous article, Alexander Wendt points out 
that  the  anarchy  has  multiple  meanings,  which  appear  from  the  interactions  among  states.
1  By 
supporting  a  constructivist  perspective  toward  International  Relations,  I  take  into  account  the 
importance of the interactions among actors in defining their interests and identities, in a mutually 
constitutive relation between structure (anarchy) and actors. I thus consider that the meanings of 
“security” and “sovereignty” are socially constructed, dynamic, and interconnected.
2
It is not my intention to investigate all the social meanings of the sovereignty and security that 
occur during interactions among political entities, from the shared sovereignty of EU member states 
to the establishment of some sort or hierarchy. In this paper I shall focus on the interventions made 
by the former imperial powers, mainly with military means, in the territories that used to be under 
their control.  
The starting points for investigating such a theme are three empirical observations. Firstly, the 
weak states facing an external intervention that I envisage are mainly those that used to be part of an 
empire, now part of what is generally known as the Third World. Secondly, the former imperial 
power tends to be the main subject (if not the only one) of the intervention, so that it can be granted a 
special interest in conducting the operation. The question that I raise is why precisely the former 
empire is taking the initiative in dealing with the situation and the answer I suggest is that happens 
because of the special links that bond the two actors. I group such links in a “post-imperial order”. 
Thirdly, I consider that these interventions can be divided into two major categories: those designated 
mainly to protect interests of the former imperial patron and those that have as the prime objective to 
protect the lives and properties of the people living in the countries affected by the failure of the state. 
Based on these three observations, I suggest in this paper that the post-imperial orders imply 
that the former imperial powers are in particular interested in interfering in those weak states that 
used to be under their control. The relations among states succeeding an empire would thus have 
distinguishing features from other kinds of international links. In my opinion, these special relations 
between the former centre and subordinated units of an empire, the post-imperial identities and 
interests, could offer some good answers for the study of contemporary international security issues. 
In order to investigate the post-imperial orders, the first necessary step would be a definition 
of the empire and to distinguish it from other forms of political dominance over alien territories. 
Once we identified the empire, it is possible to discuss the post-imperial order. The third section of 
the paper is dedicated to identification and definition of two ideal-types of post-imperial order that I 
call power-oriented  post-imperial  order  (POPIO)  and,  respectively,  norm-oriented  post-imperial 
order (NOPIO). As I suggest in the final part of the paper, these two ideal-types may be used when 
discussing various post-imperial approaches toward international security. 
  As from the theoretical and methodological approach, as already said, the paper should be 
considered in the light of a moderate form of constructivism. By this, I consider the importance of 
material  and  ideational factors  as  well,  a  double  determination  relationship  between  agents  and 
structure,  that  the  identities  and interests  of  the  actor  should be  considered in a relation of  co-
determination, and so on. Also, due to the permanent social interactions, I take into consideration a 
dynamic perspective on the institutions and meanings. 
1  Alexander  Wendt,  “Anarchy  is  what  States  Make  of  It:  The  Social  Construction  of  Power  Politics”, 
International Organization, 46 (1992): 391-425. 
2  I  tried  to  demonstrate  this  idea  in  Radu-Sebastian  Ungureanu,  Securitate,  suveranitate  i  institu ii 
interna ionale. Crizele din Europa de Sud-Est în anii ’90 [Security, Sovereignty, and International Institutions: The 
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Empire and hegemony 
Usually, a military intervention (as the acts of inter-state war as well) can be interpreted as a 
denial of the sovereignty of the object of intervention. What I have in mind are the interventions 
made on the territory of weak states, unable to enforce the sovereignty they enjoy in an effective and 
legitimate way, but only in a formal or legalistic manner. In these particular cases, the intervention is 
not seen as the expression of an imperialist attitude, as long as it is not designed to lead to the 
construction of an empire. 
In such cases, we should reconsider the meaning of anarchy as a characteristic of international 
relations. In the field of the security institutions, in the military dimension of the term, David Lake 
considers that there are some sorts of arrangements where the anarchy is replaced by some forms of 
hierarchy between two sovereign states. He identifies in this respect several increasingly hierarchic 
security institutions, such as the spheres of influence, protectorates, informal empires, and empires
3.
Even if I consider that Lake is right in identifying some forms of hierarchy in these cases, I 
think  that  the  empire  should  be  distinguished  from  other  forms,  even  informal,  of  hierarchic 
organizations.  In  my  view,  the  main  concurrent  of  the  term  “empire”  in  this  matter  is  that  of 
“hegemon”. Both of these two concepts imply a form of dominance of a political centre over some 
foreign subjects and territories, but in a different manner. As a specific difference from “hegemony”, 
an empire would be defined by the legitimate monopoly of one centre of power to generate and 
interpret the rules of the system in a given space (considered in territorial and/ or cultural terms). On 
the contrary, in the hegemony case the simple recognition of the sovereignty of the other part implies 
that this actor is entitled in formulating and enforcing some specific rules on his own territory. In 
other words, in the case of an empire, the dominance of the centre is inner-directed, while regarding 
the hegemony the dominance of the centre is an outer-directed one.
4
The previous claim can be sustained if we consider two major features of an empire, that 
being its vocation of universality and unity (anti-entropy) over the particularities of national order 
(most empires), of the component states (as the German Empire – the Second Reich, where the 
previous existing political units, as the Kingdom of Bavaria, preserved some elements of statehood), 
religious,  linguistic,  etc,  order,  and  a  consciousness  of  the  self-assumed  mission.  This  second 
dimension – ideology – also legitimizes imperial expansion. On the other hand, following the views 
of well-known scholars of different orientations, as George Modelski
5, Robert Gilpin
6, or Robert Cox 
7, we could state that the hegemony is generally considered as the capacity of a political centre to 
produce the most performing rules and to impose them in the international system in its own profit in 
a competitive manner. As Peter Taylor puts it, a hegemonic state is a counter-imperial project
8.
3 David  A.  Lake.  “Beyond  Anarchy.  The  Importance  of Security  Institutions”,  International  Security, 26 
(2001): 132-133. 
4 According to Michael Doyle’s well-known definition, an empire consists of the “effective control whether 
formal or informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society” - Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press), 1986,30. A different position is to consider several forms of exercising influence over subordinated 
societies beside the empire – dominions, suzerainty, and hegemony. A discussion on this topic can be found in Barry 
Buzan, Richard Little, International Systems in World History. Remaking the Study of International Relations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 176-182. In my view, as I shall show, the sovereignty, norm monopoly, decision 
autonomy,  responsibility  and  common  project  are  main  issues  in  differentiating  an  empire  from  other  types  of 
dominance, which I generally group in the hegemony family. 
5 George Modelski, “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State”, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, 20 (1978): 214-235.  
6 Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18 (1988): 591-613. 
7  Robert  W.  Cox,  “Social  Forces,  States  and  World  Order:  Beyond  International  Relations  Theory”.  In 
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
8 Peter Taylor. In Christopher Chase-Dunn et al., “Hegemony and Social Change – The Forum”, Mershon 
International Studies Review, 38 (1994): 363-364. 1714  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
These two positions – of an imperial or a hegemonic state – can be fulfilled by the same 
political centre, but not necessary. By taking a look at the roles played by Britain during, roughly, the 
19
th century, we would find out that it was a participant at the European balance of power (a great 
power among others), the political centre of its empire, but the world’s hegemon, as long as she 
imposed international rules such as the gold standard, the anti-slavery and anti-piracy policies, the 
free trade, etc, norms to be observed not only by the small states, but also by her competitors in the 
imperial project. One could also say that even the imperialist project was also a norm, to be followed 
by every great power of the time with the ambition of being treated as such. The Italian or German 
claims of a right in building a colonial empire in the pre-War World I era are eloquent in this 
direction.
The difference between empire and hegemony appears even clearer if we take a closer look to 
the specific orders they create. For the hegemonic power, the order is considered to address some 
sovereign units, so that at least formally one could say that it faces an anarchic order. On the other 
hand, in the case of an empire a metropolitan power imposes an imperial order over alien societies/ 
territories in two major ways. The first is the material and legal superiority in violent means, even if 
in many cases a monopoly in this matter is lacking. Secondly, an empire is a common normative 
system, both formal and informal, even if some local particularities are allowed.
9
The normative monopoly seems to be the most important defining feature of an empire, the 
claim of the legitimate violent means being only its necessary consequence. In this respect, the 
influential Empire of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri is very suggestive: “The concept of Empire 
is presented as a global concert under the direction of  a single conductor, a unitary power that 
maintains the social peace and produces its ethical truths. And in order to achieve these ends, the 
single power is given the necessary force to conduct, when necessary, “just wars” at the borders 
against the barbarians and internally against the rebellious.”
10 The “natural” expansionism of the 
empire is in intrinsic normative logic, so that it “exhausts historical time, suspends history, and 
summons the past and future within its own ethical order. In other words, Empire presents its order as 
permanent, eternal, and necessary.”
11 For the Euro-centric world, the very model of the unity is the 
Roman Empire. The memory of its magnificence, civilization and glory mobilized every European 
imperial project since Antiquity, and each of them tried very hard to present itself as the legitimate 
Roman heir. 
Compared  with  the  imperial  order,  the  hegemonic  normative  space  is  significantly  less 
defined, mainly because of the anarchic order it describes, and so are the manifestations of its power. 
“Compared to  empire,  hegemony  is  commonly  seen  as a  shallower  and  less  intrusive  mode  of 
control.”
12 Usually lacking a formal responsibility for the domestic politics of the states where it 
exercises its dominance, the hegemonic power has more freedom in selecting the nature and range of 
the intervention. But in order to preserve the legitimacy of its predominance (as a “counter-imperial 
project”), it also has to self-restraint in exercising its power. As Hurrell explains it, “stable hegemony 
rests on a delicate balance between coercion and consensus, a balance between the exercise of the 
direct and indirect power by the hegemon on the one hand and the provision of a degree of autonomy 
of action and a degree of respect for the interests of weaker states on the other.”
13
9 It is a matter of investigation if the issue of collecting and redistributing the resources should be considered as 
a central  feature of  an  empire. If  the answer is no, then  it does  not fit  the  definition of the  state, in its modern 
acceptation. The Holy Empire did not do it, but none doubted in its time about being an empire. The best understanding 
of the fact is offered by the constructivist approach, any given concept having several meanings that appear during the 
social interactions, and knowing chronological dynamics.  
10 Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 10. 
11 Hardt, Negri, Empire, 11. 
12Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constituency of International Society (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 262. 
13 Hurrell, On Global Order, 270. 1715
By  returning  now  to  David  Lake’s  classification  of  the  hierarchic  structures  of  the 
international realm, I believe that the first three forms (spheres of influence, protectorates, informal 
empires) could be considered as belonging to the family of hegemonic dominance. They are ordered 
according to the range of the involvement of the centre, being expressions of some sort of a soft, a 
medium and a hard hegemony in material, military terms. I tried to show that the empire is a different 
kind of dominance, and in what it follows I suggest that the post-imperial order can be seen as some 
sort of hegemony, but not necessary, only in  those cases where  the former metropolitan power 
imposes its own rules to the succeeding states. 
In spite of the fact that there are authors convinced that a world-state is inevitable
14 or that 
empire is an immanent threat toward the freedom of the world’s citizens
15, empirically one could 
observe that the fate the empires are facing seems to be their unravel (at least of the political units 
considered in this paper). It is now the moment to take a closer look to the relations built among the 
states that follow an empire or, in other words, to identify and investigate a post-imperial order, if 
possible. 
Empire and post-imperial order 
As I have shown, it is the intention of this paper to investigate and conceptualize the features 
and typology of the post-imperial orders. In this respect, I think that a brief comparative look to the 
British and, respectively, the Russian Empires could prove to be very fruitful. I am using the plural 
form when speaking about the Russian empire because I consider it in its both forms, Tsarist and 
Soviet. By doing so, I shall try to mark either the elements of continuity and specificity of both these 
two empires governed from Moscow. 
There are at least two reasons for choosing them: firstly, they were the very embodiment of 
two different forms of imperialism, so that I formulate as a first hypotheses that the post-imperial 
orders that they generate would be quite different; secondly, they were the most powerful players in 
the imperialist game, and each of them managed, at the climax of their territorial expansion, to 
control roughly one fifth of the earth, so that the post-imperial orders that they eventually generated 
represented the widest spread. 
The differences between a commercial, sea-born empire, on one hand, and a militaristic land-
based on the other are quite known in IR theory. A classical geopolitical approach is visible in 
Dominic Lieven’s commentary: 
The contrast between British commercial and Russian military–dynastic empire overlaps with 
another distinction: the one between maritime and land empire. Since from the sixteenth century to 
the creation of the railway (and actually in many cases beyond) long-distance trade was far cheaper 
and quicker by water one reason for the overlap is clear. In the view of many scholars the contrast 
between maritime and  land  empire  also entails  the  distinction  between a far-flung collection  of 
colonies in the former case, and a polity which is in embryo at least a unified state, and maybe even a 
potential  nation-state.  Added  together,  these  contrasts  are  often  summarized  as  the  distinction 
between liberal, diffuse maritime power on the one hand, and autocratic, centralizing land empire on 
the other.
16
Although  Lieven’s  perspective  is  compelling,  there  are  perhaps  of  making  only  two 
comments to add. First, the logics behind empire-building are quite different: in the British case, it 
was, for the most part of its history, an individualistic enterprise, where the state came lately into the 
scene. More or less, it was built on a bottom-up dynamic. For the Russian case, it was mainly a state-
14  Alexander  Wendt,  "Why  a  World  State  is  Inevitable”,  European  Journal of  International  Relations, 9 
(2003): 491-542  
15 Hardt, Negri, Empire.
16 Dominic Lieven, “Empire on Europe’s Periphery”. In Imperial Rule, eds. Alexei Miller, Alfred J. Rieber 
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guided effort, driven by territorial defense and expansion, so that it can be considered a top-down 
project.
  The diffuse nature of the British Empire outlined by Lieven implies a much larger freedom 
for the colonies and territories
17 than for the Russian example. Even ideological, the British Empire 
envisaged in its late period its natural collapse as the moment when the indigenous people would be 
able of self-governing. The distinction between colonies and dominions is not only a matter of race, 
but also one of governmental aptitudes.
18 In the Russian example, the autocracy offered a much 
harsher  political  environment,  so  that  the  relations  between  the  centre  and  the  subjects  can  be 
considered strictly hierarchic.
19
  The second comment concerns the position of the centre inside the empire. Queen Victoria 
was Empress of India in her capacity of ruler of the United Kingdom, which had a distinct identity 
inside  the  empire,  preceding,  co-existing  and  succeeding  it.  His  correspondent  in  Russia  was 
“Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias”. Russia itself (Great Russia, distinct from White Russia – 
Belarus, and Little Russia – Ukraine) had not a distinct personality. Curiously, in Russian Empire’s 
heir, the Soviet Union, the situation somehow perpetuated, at least at the level of ideological tools.
20
Russia was the empire, not (only) its core.  
In these circumstances, Lieven’s consideration of the Tsarist Empire as a “potential nation-
state” should be considered with caution. This potential nation-state would have needed a nation, but 
a nation that contained the Russians in a larger political community. The Russians entered in nations’ 
era not only without political instruments of building a “community of will”, but, one can speculate, 
also without a socially relevant idea of imaging a history and a future separated from those of other 
such political entities.
21
The Bolshevik Revolution, besides having as an immediate effect the dismantlement of the 
Tsarist Empire, brought a Marxist ideological dilemma in the issue of imperialism. On the one hand, 
there should be considered the self-determination right of the proletariat from the ancient exploiter, 
meaning the right to secession of the proletarians living on alien territories. On the other hand, the 
nation-state is, from a Marxist point of view, the expression of the interests of the exploiting upper-
classes, and so the only legitimate country for the all the proletarians would be the Soviet Union. 
Eventually, the imperialist project won, and almost all the territories once part of the Tsarist Empire 
returned by violent means under Moscow’s control.  
The ideological factor had two important consequences for the imperial identity. Internally, it 
offered a much more powerful unifying tool in the hands of the political elite of the centre than the 
autocracy gave. Externally, while the Tsarist Empire was an accepted member of the international 
society, the Soviet Union, because of its revolutionary character, gained this status only in the eve of 
17 The histories of relations between London and the “white colonies”, but also with the local rulers in India, 
are eloquent in this respect. 
18 See, for instance, the discussion of the inter-war period regarding India’s capacity for gaining the dominion 
status. 
19  For a much detailed discussion over  the  social  conditions in  the  British  and,  respectively, the Russian 
empires, see Lieven, “Empire on Europe’s Periphery”, 141-147. 
20 For instance, all the Soviet republics had their own Communist Party, except for Russia, where the Soviet 
Union’s Communist Party (the “general” one) was acting. At individual level, it is also to note that many political 
leaders of the Soviet Union were born outside Russia. It is enough to mention in this respect the names of I. V. Stalin, a 
Georgian, and Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian. Examples as such are indicators for considering that in the Soviet 
Union the Russian national political identity was to be subsumed to the imperial, Soviet, one.  
21 The above sentence should not be red as there was no Russian nationalism during the 19
th century, but that it 
can not be compared with its contemporary counterparts in the terms of social relevance and political impact. For a 
good insight over the issue see, for instance, Alexei Miller, “The Empire and the Nation in the Imagination of Russian 
Nationalism”.  In  Imperial  Rule,  eds.  Alexei  Miller,  Alfred  J.  Rieber  (Budapest;  New  York:  Central  European 
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the World War II. During the Cold War, the ideology was for the Soviet Union both a form of power, 
and an impediment in shaping social relations at international level.  
The Soviet imperialist ideology was at least twice revised regarding its exclusive sphere of 
influence, the “external” or “informal” Soviet empire.
22 The first was represented by the moment 
when Moscow imposed friendly regimes in the satellite countries, in the period following the end of 
War World II. The second important moment came in the late 1960’s, with the Brezhnev Doctrine. I 
should highlight the fact that the manifestations of projects in the political life should be considered 
as forms of hegemony. The imperialism is the ideology that made such policies possible, not the 
practices - a possible political unifying project that never came into fact, simply because the countries 
in question preserved their sovereignty. The perspective in its ideological dimension was formally 
ended with the announcement of the Sinatra Doctrine in 1989. 
  In brief, it can be said that there were some important differences between the British and 
Russian  empires:  maritime  versus  land,  colonial  versus  territorial,  liberal  versus  autocratic/ 
communist, state-core versus empire-core, etc. The brief comparative discussion above is not meant 
to exhaust the topic, but to offer a better understanding on two different kinds of relations that can 
emerge between the metropolis and its former alien subordinated units after the  collapse of the 
empire. I intend to use this comparison in order to build two ideal-types of the post-imperial orders. 
The ideal-types of the post-imperial orders 
  Part of the Weberian intellectual tradition of the Social Sciences, the constructivist approach 
underlines the importance of the comprehensive perspectives. Intellectual constructs as the ideal- 
types are meant to clarify the analytic effort of the researcher, even if the situations met in the real 
social, lacking the purity of the concept, can only approximate one pattern or another. 
  The main purpose of this paper is to offer a perspective on the involvement of the former 
imperial powers in their former colonies/ territories for a better understanding of some dramatic 
contemporary international security issues. I consider that some good answers can be found in the 
common past that provides special identities and interests. 
  In my view, these present special relations originating in the imperial past can be grouped in 
two main forms. In the first one, the attitudes, behaviors and policies of the former imperial power 
can be seen as designed to fulfill only its interests. The present sovereign states that used to be under 
its control are considered to be its “natural” backyard – if not in the empire, at least in its sphere of 
influence. Any external interference, particularly those regarding the hard security, are seen by the 
decision-makers of the former empire as menacing its influence, and consequently as unfriendly and 
veritable  threats  toward  the  international  stability.  In  the  relations  established  with  the  new 
independent states the former metropolis tends to act like a suzerain, and to replace the empire with a 
form of hegemony, mainly in its military dimension. The imperial dream is somehow still present in 
the most parts of the political class and inside the society as a whole, who tends to consider that 
period as the nation’s “golden age”. I name such a relations-complex (involving decision-makers, 
societies, states and other social actors) a power-oriented post-imperial order (POPIO). 
  In the second case, the former imperial power is somehow “ashamed” by its imperial past, 
in particular by the excesses, the most intrusive forms of its dominance of the life of its subordinated 
societies.  If  nothing  can  be  made  in  order  to  remedy  the  errors  of  the  past,  a  sentiment  of 
responsibility toward the future of the former colonies becomes widespread in the society. The loss 
of  the  empire  being  accepted,  the  former  imperial  power  also  faces  the  failure  of  the  claimed 
legitimate monopoly over the normative space. The imperial values should be replaced only by an 
even larger set (as the Human Rights doctrine), more universal, less controversial. In such a post-
22 More considerations on this issue could be found, for instance, in Alexander Wendt, Daniel Friedheim, 
“Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State”. In State Sovereignty as Social Construct, eds. 
Thomas J. Biersteker, Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 1718  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
imperial order, the external interference is accepted as long as the interventionist proves itself to be a 
valid interpreter of the norms. In this norm-oriented post-imperial order (NOPIO), the Civilized 
Other is accepted, desired, invited to observe, interpret and act. 
In my view, one major difference between the two ideal-types of post-imperial orders can be 
seen as similar to those between multilateralism and bilateralism, but at the normative and, more 
important, the interpretative level. Thus, I extend John Ruggie’s meanings of these terms from those 
interests  and  identities  embodied  in  formal  agreements
23  to  encompass  all  kind  of  shared 
understandings and practices, many of them being visible only in the management of occurring crisis 
or other moments.  
Some additional comments should be made. First, we could say that in a POPIO an empire’s 
heir is considering itself a “genuine” nation state. The identities of such an actor are those shaped by 
the structural conditions of a state having to act in an anarchical environment. The new actor is 
supposed to have the usual interests of a nation-state in a Hobbesian world, where power and self-
help are the governing principles of the relationships among sovereign entities. In a NOPIO, the 
universal project is preserved, but reconsidered – the failure of the normative monopoly does not 
meant that it has to be replaced by an egoistic set of values, but by a larger one, less ideological. The 
new identity being achieved, the possibility to make mistakes, the acceptance of the social change – 
all these would shape new interests toward the former colonies and territories. 
  I should also highlight the fact that these ideal-types refer to post-imperial orders, not actors. 
It is theoretical possible that the same former imperial power would build/ desire to build a POPIO in 
certain cases and a NOPIO in others. Such an observation could be considered illogic, or even 
hypocrisy, for certain theories, but the fact is consistent to the constructivist approach, where every 
actor knows a particular set of identities and interests, stable but not perennial. Generally speaking, 
certain  stability  in  pursuing  a  specific  post-imperial  order  is  to  be  expected  from  each  former 
imperial power (if we are not in front of a schizophrenic actor), but the exceptions would be not 
unavoidable.  There  are  two  situations,  at  least,  to  be  noticed  when  such  thing  is  possible:  the 
evolution of the norms themselves and their socially recognized valid interpretation, on the one hand, 
and the situations when the actor would risk to act in a manner close to cognitive dissonance, so that 
it has to choose between becoming the “prisoner” of the norm, or to re-prioritize its identities and 
interests. 
It is also possible to consider the two ideal-types as stages of the same process. Till now, there 
are too few examples in this field. As I shall discuss later, there are some indicators that one post-
imperial order could replace the other. A constructivist perspective of this factor would take into 
consideration both material and ideational factors, continuous and slow changes of the interests and 
identities of the agent, and the dynamics of social structures. It should also be said that such process 
does not necessarily involve something inevitable or irreversible- the social-oriented approach rejects 
such a perspective. But if such a tendency exists, it should be discovered. 
I consider that in the contemporary world the two forms of post-imperial orders coexist and 
produce social effects. In the next section of this paper I intend to comment some of their most 
visible manifestations and interactions in international security issues. 
International security through post-imperial orders  
It is a matter of empirical observations that in the last century the great powers progressively 
abandoned  the  imperialist  projects  and  policies,  in  the  conception  considered  here.  Several 
explanations could be offered here, from the nature of military power (for instance, the significance 
of the nuclear factor) or the relative decrease of the importance of the territory till to the spreading of 
nation-state ideology, but it is not my intention to identify and investigate all of them. I want to point 
23  John  Gerard  Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an  Institution”, International  Organization, 46
(1992): 561-598. 1719
out some changes in the political ideas governing the world. Martha Finnemore suggests that, in 
contemporary politics, “most states do not want more territory nor do they see force as an effective or 
legitimate means of obtaining it.  More territory is no longer a marker of  state  success  or  state 
greatness”.
24
Finnemore’s statement can be best understood in the context of her book. Attached to the 
constructivist approach, she underlines that the norms governing the international politics are in a 
permanent and continuous change. The argument is completed by saying that the above changes 
continuously produce new institutions of the world order, that exercise a structural pressure over all 
social actors. In my opinion, in a constructivist perspective the institutions and agents should be 
considered in dynamic co-determination relationship.  
  The fact that the great powers abandoned the imperialist policies does not mean that there 
are all considered in the same fashion. The interventions vary greatly in the terms of international 
support and legitimacy, and asking “why such a thing would happen?” is appropriate. 
  In domestic politics, the legitimacy of government is conferred by the objects of governing 
acts.  By  applying  these  observations  to  the  international  field,  the  legitimacy  of  an  external 
intervention would be conferred by the two kinds of subjects involved: those who suffer it and the 
citizens of the interventionist state, to whom the decision-makers are responsible to. The anarchic 
nature of the international system – lacking a monopoly in issuing, interpreting and enforcing rules - 
makes such a judgment insufficient, so that the interventionist looks for some support of interpreting 
the rules even outside, from other nation states and from a inter-/ transnational public opinion. 
POPIO
A POPIO could be considered today as the “wrong” way of understanding the international 
politics, due to the exclusivist claim of a single power to manage all the important matters in a self-
designated sphere of influence. For instance, in Western opinion at least, Russia’s treatment of the 
former  Soviet space  as her  own backyard is  usually considered both  a  threat to the address of 
international security and obsolete in its norms and practices.
25 Of course, one could say that this 
interpretation is only a form of the hegemonic power of the West in imposing its judgments on 
international level
26. The correctness of this statement or finding a better explanation is not relevant 
to the aim of the present paper, since the  fact that this position produces social effects is more 
important. 
  In my view, Russia’s attempts to establish a POPIO are somehow predictable, because of 
the identity transformations she has suffered in the last twenty years. The end of the Cold War and 
the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  were  accompanied  by  the  renouncement  to  the  ideology,  the 
imperial unifying factor. At that moment, Russia faced the imperative of building a state and even a 
supporting nation as soon as possible. As for her political identity in international relations, Andrei 
Tsykankov discovered in 1997 at least four different and colliding projects, each of them having its 
supporters in the political and academic circles: the international institutionalism, the defensive and 
offensive realism, and the revolutionary expansionism
27.
24 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention. Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY; 
London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 140; emphasis in original. 
25 A huge bibliography is dedicated to this subject in recent years. For a short and suggestive description, see 
Andrei P. Tsygankov , “Projecting Confidence, Not Fear: Russia’s Post-Imperial Assertiveness”, Orbis, 50 (2006), 677-
679. An extended investigation over Russia’s foreign policy can be found in Roger E. Kanet (ed.). Russia – Re-
Emerging Great Power (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
26  On  Western  normative  influence  in  International  Relations  see,  for  instance,  Anthony  Pagden“Human 
Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s Imperial Legacy”, Political Theory, 31 (2003): 171-199. 
27  Andrei  P.  Tsygankov,  “From  International  Institutionalism  to  Revolutionary  Expansionism”,  Mershon 
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Almost a decade later, Andrei Tsykankov considers that it is a mistake to look at Russia as to 
an imperialist power, but to treat her as a state looking after its own national interests, the Kremlin’s 
policies being “post-imperial and largely defensive. They seek to pursue opportunities for economic 
growth and stability and to address remaining security threats”
28. Russia is using more and more the 
instruments of soft power, in Tsygankov’s view, designed to project influence, not power, in the 
former Soviet Union. For Tsygankov, “strengthening Russia’s ties in the former Soviet region does 
not require revising existing territorial boundaries, depriving neighbors of their political sovereignty, 
or taking on the burden of an imperial responsibility, successful application of soft power weakens 
the appeal of Russia’s traditional imperialists and strengthens security in the region”
29.
Translating  Tsygankov’s 2006 analysis in his own 1997 terms suggests that  in the last 
decade the liberal and revolutionary approaches became less influential in Russia, and that now her 
behavior could be best understood in the terms of some sort of realism. I think that Tsygankov is 
right in his argument and I shall try to put it in a theoretical manner, which would consider today 
Russia a unitary nation-state actor pursuing its interests in the anarchic environment in a selfish 
manner.  The  analysis  is  supported  by  events  and  processes  at  both  internal  and  external  level. 
Internally, the two Chechen Wars, for  instance, were designed to  ensure the rule of the central 
government over the entire territory of the state – violently affirming the statehood. Externally, the 
opposition  made  toward  the  “colored  revolutions”  (in  Tsygankov’s  terms)  and  their  political 
outcomes, to NATO’s expansion or the Georgian intervention are all meant to formulate a sphere of 
exclusive  hegemony,  not  a  new  empire,  or  a  POPIO  in  the  terms  suggested  by  this  paper. 
Nevertheless, this kind of management the sphere of influence is rejected by Russia’s interaction 
partners as brutal forms of (re)imposing the hegemony. The Georgian crisis in the summer of 2008 is 
eloquent in this respect. This case also offers a good example for a previous statement I have made 
that that in a POPIO the hegemon do not accept Others’ intervention. It is also to be said that the 
Others do not consider Russia’s norm interpretation as valid (the parallel between the statehood of 
Kosovo on the one hand and South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other being rejected). 
  The above discussion directs me to the next subsequent question, related to the different 
interpretations  of  the  interventions  in  weak  states.  If  the  military  management  of  international 
security in a POPIO looks today like a morally condemnable enterprise, one should ask how other 
interventions can appear as much more desirable. In other words, what makes an intervention made 
in a NOPIO to be seen as more legitimate than that in a POPIO?  
I think that in order to answer this question it is necessary to look closer at the establishment 
conditions of a NOPIO, and the Western experience in this respect would offer a good insight. For 
instance, at the end of World War II, the British political elite contemplated both the inevitable march 
toward independence of some of the most important colonies and territories of the Empire (namely 
India) and the ambition of being one of the major powers of the world, comparable with the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The solution was to replace the imperial order with a hegemonic one, so 
that the British decision-makers made appeal to an older instrument, the Commonwealth, formerly 
opened only to the Dominions, the “white” part of the empire. 
The modern Commonwealth was not the natural successor to the old prewar Commonwealth 
that had been held together by ties of kith and kin, common ideals, and partnership. This updated 
version  was  a  Whitehall  device  to  protect  old  spheres  of  interest  from  competing  influences, 
including  from  the  USA,  to  offer  the  new  members  some  off-the-shelf  international  status  and 
prestige, certain benefits in economic, trade and military assistance, and to prevent the spread of 
communism.
30
28 Tsigankov, “Projecting Confidence, Not Fear”, 684. 
29 Tsigankov, “Projecting Confidence, Not Fear”, 686. 
30  Krishnan  Srinivasan,“Nobody’s  Commonwealth?  The  Commonwealth  in  Britain’s  Post-imperial 
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Obviously,  the  United  Kingdom  faced  the  harsh  pressures  of  the  Cold  War  and  had  to 
renounce at the claims of being comparable with the two giants of the bipolar era. European empires 
were doomed in the nuclear age, crashed in the superpowers’ collision. The threat of the communist 
expansion forced the European powers to search for the American security umbrella. As for the 
American strategy, even if the European colonies could prove important assets in the containment 
policy (the replacement of the French presence in Indochina after Dien-Bien-Phu, in 1954, by the 
American one), the post-colonial political identity of the  United States  was much too strong to 
sustain such a position for long period of times. The Suez Crisis in 1956 could be considered as the 
turning point of the United States’ policy toward European empires, by deciding not to support them 
any more. The decolonisation was the major political process that accompanied the Cold War for 
political reason too, because 
“[…] the Americans were coming round to the view that decolonisation was the best way to 
counter the spread of communist influence, and American pressure thenceforward became a factor in 
the independence timetable
31
In brief, one could say that, under the structural combined pressures of both the Cold War 
conditions and the spread of nationalist ideas, the great European powers had to reformulate their 
empires, the British experience being accompanied by the similar experience of France, for instance 
(the Fourth Republic’s Union française and Communuaté française of the Fifth Republic). Till now, 
it  seems  clear  that  the British  and French  Commonwealths  could  be  interpreted as  designed  to 
embody the political exclusive sphere of influence of the former imperial powers or, in the terms of 
the present paper, as POPIOs. The question is how it comes that the POPIOs were transformed in a 
NOPIO? 
NOPIO
  I think that the fundamental reason of the explanation should be searched in the unique 
experience of the West in post-World War II era. Even if we consider Western Europe during the 
Cold War under a common and foreign hegemony, the main instrument of the American military 
presence in Europe – NATO – was an anarchic one, with decisions taken on consensus, unlike the 
similar Soviet instrument, the Treaty of Warsaw
32. At the end of the Cold War period, the West noted 
that it formed a security community, whose member consider themselves linked together by mutual 
trust, based on common identities, values, meanings, norms and practices
33. As for the European part 
of this security community, right at the end of the Cold War they institutionalized their relations even 
more, by forming the European Union.  
  The common identities, values, meanings, practices of the Western security community are, 
in my view, the very basis of the NOPIO in discussion. The European Union itself contributes to the 
building of this form of post-imperial order. Firstly, the shared sovereignty of the members is, I 
believe, conceivable only if a unity project based on common identities and interest, norms and 
meanings, is taken into consideration.
34 Secondly, this unity project is not exclusive for the Other. 
31 Srinivasan,“Nobody’s Commonwealth?”, p. 262. 
32 Lake, “Beyond Anarchy”.
33  Emanuel  Adler,  Michael  Barnett,  “A  Framework  for  the  Study  of  Security  Communities”.  In  Security 
Communities, eds. Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30-37. 
34 It should be noted that most discussion of a potential future “empire” (post-sovereign institutionalized form 
of political unity) are considering UN as the most used contemporary example (for instance, Hardt, Negri, Empire, 3-8). 
The sovereignty issue makes, I think, the EU a much more appropriate example. If so, one should also reconsider the 
imperial model in interpreting the EU. In spite of the common parallel between the EU and the Roman Empire, which 
is offering the very idea of European unity, I suppose that a more fruitful comparison would be with the Holy Empire. 
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The  aim of some  of the most  challenging  component  of  the European  project (the  foreign  and 
security policies, which directly address the meaning of the sovereign state) is to shape an European 
position in the international realm without denying the partnership with the United States, but making 
efforts to ensure that the transatlantic partnership is working, based, in spite of difficulties, on shared 
principles, meanings and responsibilities
35. Special cautions are taken in this respect in particular by 
those EU members that are also NATO members
36. I should note that the former imperial powers 
show the most visible interest in establishing an European international presence. I consider that this 
fact is due to their post-imperial identity, so that these historic responsibilities and interests define the 
NOPIO. 
  In my opinion, NOPIO should not be linked to a special international institution, as the EU. 
The EU independent external force projection has been very limited, in spite of the efforts made, and 
it should be noticed that the involvement is, till now at least, conceived in co-operation with other 
organizations such as NATO or UN.
37 This does not mean that the former imperial powers would fail 
to express their concern about the weak states that used to be under their control. For instance, Italia 
took initiative in solving the difficult situation of Albania in 1991 and later a UN mission in 1997, 
and  so  was  France  with  regard  to Lebanon  in  2006.  The  instrument  is  less  important  than  the 
objective. Moreover, the organisations established to embody the former selfish POPIO’s have been 
transformed and become part of the NOPIO. It is enough to mention the present Commonwealth of 
Nations that can be compared only superficially with its ancestor (the British one) from the post –
World War II period, but not in terms of the values, goals, and practices involved. The examples can 
continue in this respect, as the similar Francophone organisation, etc. 
  Domestic political interests should not be neglected when formulating the interventions, as 
the ones considered above. It is clear that the public opinion and immigrants from the former empire 
have their role in the crisis management. The public sensibility with regard to this subject and the 
presence of immigrants are precisely the signs of post-imperial order. What does it make a NOPIO is 
that  the  crisis  management  policies  are  grounded  on  responsibility  and  not  on  power  interests. 
Multilateralism is also a key element of a NOPIO. Even if the regular allies and friends decide not to 
contribute to the operations (as the United States refused to interfere in Albania), they are consulted 
and offer the political support.  
  The last question I would like to address is the relationship between institutionalization and 
gaining the status of recognized norm generator and interpreter. In other words, if a post-imperial 
state like today Russia should became an institutionalized member of the West in order to consider 
her hegemony closer to a NOPIO than to a POPIO.  
In my view, theoretically it is possible such a future evolution. A NOPIO is based on shared 
values, meanings and practices. In order to consider Russia’s interventions legitimate in her former 
empire, they should be  based on the norms and reasons as those of the West, that the Russian 
political system could be seen as a democratic one and that the decision-making processes are not 
power in discussing the empire, and so on. It is also one more element that entitles the comparison, the normative 
dimension. For the first part of its history at least, in the Holy Empire it was only one hierarchic institution that 
functioned, a heritage from the Roman imperial unity: the Romano-Catholic Church, the main source for rules and also 
their main interpreter. In the present-day European Union, all the political processes are to be shaped by the common 
normative space, having its core outside the negotiated interests, but the common accepted basis – Human Rights 
doctrine, etc. 
35 Hartmut Mayer “The ‘Mutual’, ‘Shared’ and ‘Dual’ Responsibility of the West: The EU and the US in a 
Sustainable  Transatlantic  Alliance”.  In  A  Responsible  Europe?  Ethical  Foundations  of  EU  External  Affairs,  eds. 
Harmut Mayer, Henri Vogt (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
36 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007). 
37 Hanna Ojanen,  “The EU’s Responsibility for Global Security and Defence”  In A Responsible Europe? 
Ethical  Foundations  of  EU  External  Affairs, eds.  Harmut  Mayer,  Henri  Vogt (Basingstoke;  New  York:  Palgrave 
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indifferent to the positions of domestic public, the subject of the intervention and of the international 
partners as well. In brief, a post-imperial nation-state, as social actor, should become contemporary in 
the political  ideas  and alike  in  her interests  and identities with  others in  order to  be  no longer 
considered the Other. By retracing the already suggested parallel with the security community theory, 
the institutionalized membership to the West is not required per se in order to consider Russia’s 
predominance in her former empire as closer to a NOPIO than to a POPIO, but her observance of the 
socially recognized legitimate reasons and ways of exercising the influence. 
On the other hand, it should be said that very different evolutions could be made possible by 
the dynamics and mutual influence of material and ideational factors. The very status of great power 
or  the  rejection  on  identity  basis  of  the  Western  interpretations,  domestic  or  external  events, 
processes,  phenomena,  agents’  actions,  etc,  could  drive  to  policies  of  various  natures  –  as,  for 
instance, to preserve the POPIO, to transform it, even to give it up, and so on. In spite of a two-
century  old dream, the future of the social realm is still beyond the prediction capacities of its 
observers and interprets. 
Conclusions 
In this paper I tried to show in a constructivist approach that it is possible to consider some 
military interventions made by the great powers in weak states in the light of their imperial past. In 
this  respect,  I  differentiated  the  empire  from  other  forms  of  political  dominance,  and  the  most 
important element seemed to be the sentiment of unity and common project. When the empires 
collapsed, each of them generated a post-imperial order, that is to say special links between the 
metropolis and the sovereign states once under its control as well as special interests and identities. 
  The next step in the investigation of the post-imperial interventions was to take a closer look 
to the possible meanings of post-imperial orders. I defined in this respect two ideal forms. The first 
one, i. e. the power-oriented post-imperial order, is defined by the interests of the former political 
centre of the empire. It considers that the former empire is to be transformed in a sphere of influence 
of its own, where its special interests should be protected from any external influence, in particular in 
high  politics.  On  the  contrary,  a  norm-oriented  post-imperial  order  is  based  on  a  special 
responsibility of the former imperial power. The interactions are based on the over-sovereign norms 
governing the social interactions. The external influences are not only allowed, but even desired, as 
long as the other interventionists are considered valid interpreter of these rules. 
  In my opinion, these two ideal-types of the post-imperial order could be useful analytical 
instruments in discussing contemporary international security issues. There are intended to allow the 
avoidance of misinterpretations of the political projects and ideas behind great powers’ interventions 
in weak states. In empirical situations, these terms can suggest some possible future evolution of the 
international security problems. Theoretically, some entrenched meanings of important concepts of 
International Relations are to be reconsidered, such as sovereignty or anarchy. In a constructivist 
perspective, neither the world, nor the actors’ interpretations stop. The continuous social interactions 
generate new understandings that are to be conceptualized and analyzed, and this is the reason of the 
above paper. 
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